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Abstract 
Sixty subjects classified as high or low in social anxiety participated in a structured heterosocial in-
teraction under conditions of either high or low social-evaluative threat. Following the interaction, 
subjects were asked to recall detailed information about the interaction partner’s appearance and the 
content of the conversation. Socially anxious subjects recalled less information and made more errors 
in recall than nonanxious subjects. Contrary to prediction, social-evaluative threat did not affect re-
call. Anxious subjects also reported greater self-focused attention during the interaction. High self-
focused attention was associated with superior recall for nonanxious subjects but associated with 
more frequent omission errors for anxious subjects. Results support cognitive-behavioral formula-
tions of social anxiety which propose that socially anxious individuals engage in self-focused think-
ing which may impair their ability to process social information. 
 
Social anxiety is a common (Bryant & Trower, 1974; Pilkonis & Zimbardo, 1979) and po-
tentially debilitating problem (Amies, Gelder, & Shaw, 1983; Heimberg, Dodge, & Becker, 
1987). Recent research on social anxiety has focused on the cognitive aspects of socially 
anxious individuals, including their self-statement patterns. For example, socially anxious 
subjects report more negative (Cacioppo, Glass, & Merluzzi, 1979) and fewer positive 
(Heimberg, Acerra, & Holstein, 1985) self-statements than nonanxious subjects in anticipa-
tion of meeting a person of the opposite sex. Hartman (1984) has proposed that the self-
statements of socially anxious individuals are related to four themes: 
1. Thoughts of general social inadequacy. 
2. Concerns that their anxiety will be visible to others. 
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3. Fear of negative evaluation. 
4. Preoccupation with arousal or performance. 
 
Sarason (1975) has labeled this pattern of self-focused, negative cognitions “anxious self-
preoccupation.” Several studies suggest that socially anxious individuals are “anxiously 
self-preoccupied.” For instance, they exhibit excessive processing of information related to 
how they are viewed by others (Smith, Ingram, & Brehm, 1983), are excessively concerned 
with whether or not others will perceive their anxiety (McEwan & Devins, 1983), and re-
port more self-focused and fewer other-focused thoughts during social interactions than 
nonanxious subjects (Hope, Heimberg, Zollo, Nyman, & O’Brien, 1987). 
Various theories have proposed that anxious self-preoccupation interferes with social 
performance (Hartman, 1983; Heimberg et al., 1987). Hartman suggests that the socially 
anxious individual’s excessive focusing on his or her own cognitive, physiological, and 
behavioral processes is part of a feedback loop that distances the individual from the in-
teraction and thus interferes with his or her ability to function adequately. Others (Buss, 
1980; Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975; Leary, 1983) have suggested that a particular type 
of self-focus—the awareness of oneself as a social object, typically referred to as public self-
consciousness—is a prerequisite for the occurrence of social anxiety. Indeed, high public 
self-consciousness has been associated with sensitivity to interpersonal rejection (Fenig-
stein, 1979) and with poorer performance in a behavioral test (Hope & Heimberg, 1988), 
particularly when the individual has low expectancies for good social performance (Bur-
gio, Merluzzi, & Pryor, 1986). Assuming a fixed capacity model of attention, any attention 
focused on the self necessarily detracts from the amount of attention available to focus on 
the other individual (Wine, 1971 ). Excessive self-focus should reduce an individual’s ef-
fectiveness in social interactions by preventing him or her from devoting adequate atten-
tion to the partner’s verbal and nonverbal behavior. 
Only a few studies provide evidence that anxious self-preoccupation interferes with so-
cial functioning. For example, Heimberg et al. (1985) utilized Byrne’s (1971) attraction para-
digm to examine socially anxious and nonanxious subjects’ evaluations of potential inter-
action partners. As has been repeatedly demonstrated for normal subjects, nonanxious 
subjects preferred potential partners whom they believed to have backgrounds and atti-
tudes similar to their own. However, socially anxious subjects showed no preference for 
similar or dissimilar partners. In other words, they failed to perceive, recall, or utilize po-
tentially important social information. In a recent study with high school boys, Johnson 
and Glass (1989) found that less task-focused attention was associated with higher judges’ 
ratings of anxiety and poorer verbal skills (less elaborate responses, fewer questions, etc.) 
during a heterosocial interaction. In another study, socially anxious individuals were less 
able to recall the characteristics of individuals to whom they had just been introduced 
(Kimble & Zehr, 1982). 
Although these studies suggest that individuals high in social anxiety demonstrate def-
icits in processing social information, they do not explore the nature of such deficits during 
extended social interactions. Subjects in the Heimberg and associates study saw only back-
ground and attitude questionnaires which they believed to have been completed by the 
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potential interaction partner. Kimble and Zehr’s subjects participated only in brief intro-
ductions. Johnson and Glass used a more extensive interaction but they examined self-
statement patterns (cognitive content) rather than cognitive processes. Therefore the pre-
sent study attempted to move away from self-statement analysis and examine the social 
information processing abilities of socially anxious and nonanxious individuals during a 
heterosocial interaction. 
High and low socially anxious subjects were asked to recall information about their in-
teraction partners following a moderately structured conversation. In order to examine 
whether the amount of anxiety subjects actually experienced during the interaction would 
be related to recall, the level of social-evaluative threat was also manipulated. It was pre-
dicted that socially anxious subjects would remember less information about their interaction 
partner than nonanxious subjects, particularly under conditions of high social evaluation. 
Furthermore, it was hypothesized that subjects who experienced the poorest recall would 





Subjects were 60 undergraduate women who completed the Social Avoidance and Distress 
Scale (SADS; Watson & Friend, 1969) as part of a battery of questionnaires administered 
during group testing sessions held at the beginning of the semester. The SADS is a com-
monly used measure of social anxiety (Heimberg, 1988) and was used to screen subjects 
for the study. Those scoring in the upper or lower quartile were telephoned and invited to 
participate in a study of “first impressions” in exchange for course credit. This procedure 




Subjects arrived at the laboratory for individual appointments and were seated in a small 
waiting area in which one of three male confederates was already seated. Signs requested 
that study participants wait without conversing. After approximately two minutes, the 
male experimenter entered the waiting area and asked both the subject and the confederate 
to give their informed consent. The experimenter then escorted the subject to a small room 
containing two chairs and video- and audio-recording equipment. The two chairs were 
facing each other but were situated so that only one was in view of the video camera. 
Prior to arrival at the laboratory, subjects had been randomly assigned to one of two 
experimental conditions as a manipulation of state social anxiety. Subjects in the evaluative 
condition were seated facing the video camera and told that this was a study of the impres-
sions women make on men when they meet for the first time. Therefore, each subject 
would be asked to make the best impression possible during a conversation with the man 
she had seen in the waiting area. The experimenter emphasized that her performance 
would be evaluated by the interaction partner and by the experimenter. The latter’s eval-
uation would be based on a videotape of the interaction. (The videorecorder was never 
actually operative.) 
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Subjects in the nonevaluative condition heard a nearly identical script. However, the con-
federate was to be the target of evaluation, and the study was described as examining the 
impressions men make on women. Each subject was seated out of range of the camera and 
instructed that she was to serve as an objective observer and evaluate the man’s ability to 
make a good first impression. The experimenter assured her that she would not be evalu-
ated in any way and would not appear on the videotape. Following either the evaluative 
or nonevaluative instructions, the experimenter left the room, ostensibly to give instruc-
tions to the confederate. 
Three minutes later, the experimenter and confederate returned. The experimenter 
seated the confederate in the empty chair and explained that the subjects were to “get to know 
one another” but that the research required that their conversation be structured. The ex-
perimenter handed out sheets listing 13 items grouped under six categories—Personal In-
formation, Academic Information, Extracurricular Interests, Musical Preferences, Family 
Background, and Other (see Table 1). The confederate and subject were instructed to take 
turns providing the information in each category with the confederate speaking first. The 
importance of discussing only the assigned topics was emphasized and the participants 
were informed that this would be checked via audiotape. After questions were answered, 
the experimenter turned on the recording equipment and left the room. He returned four 
minutes later, turned off the equipment, and gave the subject the packet of questionnaires 
described below. The confederate left the room with the experimenter, ostensibly to com-
plete his questionnaires separately. Finally, the subject was debriefed. This debriefing in-
cluded assurance that no video-recording had been made and careful questioning as to 
whether she had suspected the interaction partner was a confederate. All subjects denied 
knowledge of the deception. 
 
Table 1. Topics Discussed during Structured Interactions 
Personal Information 
     Name, age, hometown 
Academic Information 
     Class year, major, residence (on- or off-campus housing and dormitory or neighborhood) 
Extracurricular Interests 
     Campus-based clubs or teams involved with, hobbies, or free-time interests 
Musical Preferences 
     Favorite music (type and groups) 
Family Background 
     Number of siblings, how it was “growing up” 
Other 
     Opinion of the university, career interests 
 
Confederates 
Three male undergraduate research assistants, blind to the specific hypotheses of the study 
and subjects’ social anxiety level, served as confederates for the study. They were carefully 
trained to be neutral and consistent during the conversations. During training it became 
apparent that the confederates would be better able to handle unexpected questions from 
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the subjects if they provided personal information rather than using a script standardized 
for all three confederates. However, the confederates were coached to provide the same 
amount of information, and each confederate’s personal script was standardized across 
subjects. Confederates’ adherence to their scripts was periodically checked by the experi-






Subjects’ recall of the interaction was assessed with a 12-item questionnaire designed spe-
cifically for this study. Ten items elicited objective information provided by the confeder-
ate ( e.g., “What is your partner’s name?”), and two items requested physically descriptive 
information (“What color was your partner’s hair?” and “Describe the shirt your partner 
wore”). Three topics included in the structured conversations (What it was like growing 
up, opinion of college, and career interests) were not included in the recall test. Because 
some items were worth more than one point (e.g., each confederate mentioned three extra-
curricular activities), possible scores ranged from 0 to 17. 
 
Self-Awareness 
A revised version of the Self-Consciousness Scale (SCS; Fenigstein et al., 1975) was used to 
assess the extensiveness of subjects’ self-focused attention during the structured conversa-
tion. Two of the SCS subscales measure awareness of personal aspects that are either visi-
ble to others (public self-consciousness) or are internal events such as thoughts and feelings 
(private self-consciousness). The third subscale assesses social anxiety. The SCS items were 
rewritten to refer to the experimental situation rather than to how subjects generally felt. 
For example, “I get embarrassed very easily” was changed to “I got embarrassed very eas-
ily.” One item on the public self-consciousness scale (“One of the last things I do before I 
leave my house is look in the mirror”) could not be easily rewritten and was omitted. Fol-
lowing Buss’s (1980) suggestion that transient states of self-consciousness be labeled “self-
awareness,” the subscales of the revised state version of the SCS will be referred to as the 
public and private self-awareness subscales. 
 
State Anxiety 
All subjects completed an 8-item assessment of their anxiety during the interaction. The 
endpoints of 5-point Likert scales were labeled with antonyms such as relaxed-tense, calm-




All dependent measures were analyzed in 2 (high versus low social anxiety) × 2 (evaluative 
versus nonevaluative condition) analyses of variance (ANOVAS). 
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Manipulation Check 
High SADS scorers (M = 2.77, SD = 0.95) achieved higher state anxiety scores during the 
interaction than low SADS scorers (M = 2.15, SD = 0.61), F(1, 56) = 7.77, p < .05. Subjects who 
were the focus of evaluation (M = 2.63, SD = 0.88) tended to report more anxiety during the 
interaction than subjects who were not the focus of evaluation (M = 2.28, SD = 0.79), F(1, 56) 
= 3.92, p < .053. The interaction effect did not approach significance. 
The pattern of subjects’ scores on the revised SCS social anxiety subscale mirrored those of 
the state anxiety measure. There was a significant main effect for anxiety classification (High 
anxiety M = 13.40, SD = 5.89; Low anxiety M = 7.07, SD = 5.20), F(1, 56) = 20.50, p < .001, and 
a nearly significant main effect for evaluation (Evaluative M = 11.32, SD = 6.07; Nonevalu-
ative M = 9.07, SD = 6.58), F(1, 56) = 3.03, p < .087. The interaction effect was not significant 
(p > .10). 
 
Recall 
Three measures were derived from the recall test-total number of items correctly recalled 
(total recall), number of items recalled incorrectly (recall errors), and number of items omit-
ted. Anxious subjects recalled less information (M = 10.03, SD = 2.71), F(1, 56) = 4.13, p < .05, 
and made more errors (M =5.93, SD =2.38), F(1, 56) = 5.29, p < .05, than nonanxious subjects 
(Total recall M = 11.30, SD = 2.28; Recall errors M = 4.77, SD = 1.61). The main effect for 
evaluation was not significant for total recall or recall errors (ps > .10). The interaction effect 
for total recall approached significance (p < .09). This interaction trend was due to anxious 
subjects’ recall deficits in the evaluative condition. 
The interaction effect of subject anxiety and evaluation was significant for the number 
of omitted items, F(1, 56) = 9.47, p < .003 (see Figure 1). Duncan’s Multiple Range Tests 
revealed that anxious/evaluative (M = 1.33, SD = 0.82) and nonanxious/nonevaluative (M 
= 1.43, SD = 1.28) subjects both omitted more information than anxious/nonevaluative (M 
= 0.73, SD = 0.88) and nonanxious/evaluative (M = 0.50, SD = 0.82) subjects who did not 




Figure 1. Mean number of items omitted on the recall task for socially anxious and non-
anxious subjects under evaluative and nonevaluative conditions. 
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Self-Awareness 
Anxious subjects reported more private self-awareness (M = 11.20, SD = 2.76), F(1, 56) = 
5.25, p < .03, and tended to report more public self-awareness (M = 15.50, SD = 4.94), F(1, 
56) = 3.45, p < .068, than nonanxious subjects (Private M = 9.40, SD = 3.28; Public M = 12.93, 
SD = 5.78). The main effect for evaluation and the interaction effect were not significant for 
either private or public self-awareness. 
Correlations between public and private self-awareness and total recall, recall errors, 
and omissions were computed separately for high and low anxious subjects. As shown in 
Table 2, public and private self-awareness were positively correlated with total recall and 
negatively related to recall errors and omissions for low anxious subjects, suggesting that 
higher levels of self-awareness facilitated recall. Most correlations were nonsignificant for 
high anxious subjects. However, higher public self-awareness was related to a higher fre-
quency of omissions for anxious subjects. 
 
Table 2. Correlations among Public and Private Self-Awareness and Recall Measures for High 
and Low Socially Anxious Subjects 
 Private Self-Awareness Public Self-Awareness 
High Socially Anxious Subjects (n = 30)   
     Total Recall .14 –.05 
     Recall Errors –.12 –.08 
     Omissions –.10 .32* 
Low Socially Anxious Subjects (n = 30)   
     Total Recall .47** .44** 
     Recall Errors –.39* –.33* 
     Omissions –.39* –.40* 




It was hypothesized that socially anxious subjects would demonstrate more recall deficits 
than·nonanxious subjects following a heterosocial interaction. This hypothesis was largely 
supported. Anxious subjects recalled less information and made more recall errors than 
nonanxious subjects. However, when recall was defined in terms of the number of items 
omitted, the hypothesis was not supported. Anxious subjects in the evaluative condition 
and nonanxious subjects in the nonevaluative. condition both omitted more information 
than anxious/nonevaluative and nonanxious/evaluative subjects. It was predicted that the 
anxious/evaluative group would have high omission scores, but the poor performance of 
nonanxious/nonevaluative subjects was unexpected. Examination of the data for nonanx-
ious/nonevaluative subjects indicates that their total recall was similar to that of nonanx-
ious/evaluative subjects. However, if they did not know the answer, they left the item 
blank rather than making errors. Perhaps absence of both high-trait social anxiety and high 
social-evaluative threat made these subjects more willing to admit when they could not 
recall certain items. 
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It was also expected that the anxious subjects’ recall deficits would be most pronounced 
under conditions of high social-evaluative threat. Although there was a trend in that di-
rection for total recall, the other two analyses (recall errors and omissions) did not support 
this hypothesis. Failure to find the expected interaction between social anxiety and evalu-
ative threat’ may be attributable to the level of anxiety subjects experienced. As noted, the 
effects of the evaluation manipulation on state anxiety just missed conventional levels of 
significance (p < .053). An inspection of the means for state anxiety reveals that, even in the 
nonevaluative condition, socially anxious subjects reported more anxiety (M = 2.47) than 
nonanxious subjects in either condition (Evaluative M = 2.22; Nonevaluative M = 2.07). 
Apparently just participating in a heterosocial interaction, even one in which they were 
not the focus of attention, induced anxiety for anxious subjects. Nonanxious subjects were 
relatively comfortable whether or not they were to be evaluated. Interestingly, Johnson 
and Glass (1989) also failed to find effects on a variety of cognitive and behavioral 
measures with a similar manipulation of social evaluative threat. 
As expected, high anxious subjects reported more private self-awareness and tended to 
report more public self-awareness than nonanxious subjects. When the relationship be-
tween self-awareness and recall was examined separately for high and low anxious sub-
jects, two distinct patterns emerged. For nonanxious subjects, greater public and private 
self-awareness was associated with better recall. For anxious subjects only one correlation 
was significant, but it showed the opposite relationship—high public self-awareness was 
associated with more omissions. Thus self-awareness appears to serve a facilitative func-
tion for nonanxious subjects but a disruptive function for anxious subjects. This is only 
partially supportive of the second hypothesis that recall deficits would be associated with 
excessive self-focused attention. However, given the number of studies linking social anxiety 
and attentional focus, the nature of the relationship between social anxiety, self-awareness, 
and recall merits further investigation. 
The social information-processing deficits that were associated with high social anxiety 
in this study are important because of their potential to disrupt social interactions. If an 
individual cannot recall specific information about an interaction partner, he or she risks 
making inappropriate comments and/or may miss opportunities to further the conversa-
tion by not responding to previously communicated information. Such disruption in the 
interaction would likely increase the individual’s anxiety which may, in turn, produce 
more disruption and more anxiety. 
There is some evidence to suggest that recall deficits like those found in the present 
study are associated with disrupted social performance and anxiety. For example, socially 
anxious subjects elaborate less on current and past conversation topics (Johnson & Glass, 
1989) and speak less during social interactions (Conger & Farrell, 1981). 
Furthermore, we have noted that social phobics in our treatment program (Heimberg, 
Becker, Goldfinger, & Vermilyea, 1985; Heimberg, Dodge, Hope, Kennedy, Zollo, & 
Becker, 1990) often indicate that they do not know what to say during anxiety-provoking 
interactions. It may be that they do not recognize available conversation topics because of 
excessive self-focus. 
Taken together, these findings support cognitive models of social anxiety (Hartman, 
1983; Leary, 1983) which hypothesize that the behavioral deficiencies associated with high 
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social anxiety may be a byproduct of inadequate processing of social information rather 
than lack of skill. For example, anxious individuals may fail to ask appropriate questions 
which elaborate on a previous topic because they do not remember the topic. This is very 
different from a skills deficit model which attributes failure to ask questions to inadequate 
questioning skills or lack of knowledge that asking a question would facilitate the conver-
sation. From the information-processing perspective, increasing questioning skills would 
be an ineffective treatment strategy unless the individual also learned to focus more atten-
tion on the conversation and on the interaction partner. 
Obviously, this does not rule out the possibility that some socially anxious individuals 
have skill deficits. However, it does imply that careful assessment of both social skills and 
social information-processing strategies is needed before selecting a treatment interven-
tion. 
This study demonstrated that socially anxious subjects process social information dif-
ferently from nonanxious subjects during moderately structured social interaction. How-
ever, the study does not indicate whether the recall deficits found in the anxious subjects 
were specific to social information in interactions or represented more general deficits. 
From our work with social phobics, we hypothesize that the recall deficits occur only in 
social situations which provoke anxiety, but that in those situations, all aspects of infor-
mation processing (including non-social information) is disrupted. Finally, the present 
study utilized only women as subjects. Although we have no reason to believe these find-
ings would not generalize to men, this issue needs empirical examination. 
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